RELIANT SCALE ATLAS · INTEGRATION
Four operations.
Nothing else to learn.
Atlas records what an agent did, what evidence it relied on, what it was authorised to do, and what happened afterward. The interface is deliberately small, because a service that has never had a customer should not have a large attack surface. This page is here so your engineers can evaluate it before anyone talks to us.
Held stateCONTROLLED PILOT / NO PUBLIC SIGNUP · NO SELF-SERVICE CREDENTIAL · NO PRODUCTION ACCESS FROM THIS PAGE
01 / The interface
Four operations.
That is the whole contract.
Authentication is a scoped, revocable credential presented as a bearer token. It is not one of the four operations; it is the boundary applied to all of them.
What a receipt is hereAn accountability receipt is a durable, attributed record of one action and the inputs that were knowable when it was decided. It is not the same object as the Ed25519-sealed verification receipt described elsewhere on this site, and it does not claim to be.
02 / Behaviour worth checking
Most of these only matter
when something goes wrong.
Which is exactly when you find out whether they were implemented. Each of these is proven by a test we will run in front of you.
Revoking access must never erase the account of what was done.
- 01
Revocation takes effect on the very next request
There is no session and no cache. Every request re-reads the credential's state, so a revoked key stops working immediately rather than at the end of a token lifetime.
- 02
A denial is still accountable work
An action refused for being outside its scope produces a receipt and is metered. A prevented unauthorised action is the service doing its job, not a failed request.
- 03
The record outlives the credential
Revoking access never erases the account of what was done. Receipts survive revocation and termination.
- 04
Tenant boundaries do not confirm existence
A receipt belonging to another organisation returns not-found rather than forbidden, so a stranger learns nothing from the difference.
- 05
An unknown key and a revoked key look identical
Both are refused the same way, so neither teaches an attacker anything about which keys once existed.
03 / Replay
What was knowable
at the time.
Most systems can tell you what happened. Replay answers a different question: was the decision defensible given the evidence available when it was made, and what has changed since. It reconstructs the stored decision-time envelope and names the differences. It does not re-run a model, and it never re-decides history against today's state.
Said preciselyReplay is forensic reconstruction. Where nothing has changed, it says so — because “no later change has been admitted” is itself a finding worth recording.
04 / Deployment
One service.
Several envelopes.
Atlas runs today as a hardened Linux service under systemd. An OCI package built with a daemonless toolchain is under qualification, and managed orchestration follows from the same artifact where scale justifies it. If your security policy forbids a container runtime, that is a supported answer rather than a limitation: Atlas does not require one.
How we describe readinessThe deployment envelope may change; the governed behaviour may not. Equivalence across profiles is proven by running the same customer lifecycle against each, not asserted.
Begin
One agent. One workflow.
One accountability record.
The Founding Enterprise Pilot is a bounded engagement at US$20,000, credited toward the first year of consumption. Workspaces and credentials are opened by Reliant Scale with the customer, not created from this page.
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Atlas is accountability infrastructure. It is not a legal-compliance certification for any regulation, and nothing on this page should be read as one.